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Imaginary Intent: The California
Supreme Court's Search for a Specific
Legislative Intent That Does Not Exist
By JASON M. HORST*
EARLY ONE MORNING in September 1866, David Harris went to
the polls in San Francisco and voted in the general election for State
Senate and Assembly.' Several hours and a number of drinks at a local
tavern later, Harris returned to the same precinct and attempted to
vote again. 2 A gentleman who had been at the polling place earlier
warned Harris that he had already voted and would face punishment
should he vote again.3 An inebriated Harris assured the man strongly
that he had not done so and took an oath to this affect. 4 He then
voted for what he believed was the first time that day. 5 He was arrested
and later convicted under a statute forbidding double voting.6
At trial, Harris alleged that he did not know at the time that he
had already voted and thus had no guilty intent.7 The statute under
which he was charged included neither an explicit knowledge require-
ment, nor a provision discounting the need for such knowledge.8 The
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1. People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678, 679 (1866).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 679-80.
5. Id. at 680.
6. Id. at 679.
7. Id. at 680-81.
8. See id. at 680-82.
trial court gave the jury instructions that in order to convict Harris
they need not find that he had voted twice knowingly. 9 Harris ap-
pealed to the California Supreme Court, saying that the offense in-
cluded a knowledge requirement. 10
The California Supreme Court was thus presented with the ques-
tion at the center of this Comment. Given a statute that neither ex-
pressly includes nor excludes an explicit mens rea11 element, how
should the court approach a case in which a defendant asserts that he
did not possess guilty knowledge? Should the court base its determina-
tion on societal policy concerns, the purpose of the statute in ques-
tion, or the intent of the Legislature? This Comment begins to
address these questions. In doing so, it establishes that the California
Supreme Court has adopted an approach to these cases that is out of
step with sound legal theory and the nature of law in California. In-
stead of weighing the policy implications of reading a mens rea re-
quirement into a silent statute, as the court has traditionally done in
the past, the court's new and faulty approach entails a quest for legis-
lative intent that simply does not exist.
Part I argues that through two recent cases, In reJorge M.12 and In
reJennings,13 the California Supreme Court has adopted a framework
for approaching silent statute cases that represents a significant depar-
ture from well-established case law. This new framework focuses first
and foremost on finding the California Legislature's specific intent in
drafting the statute. 14 The court's primary tool in this quest is legisla-
tive history. 15 The court has expressed the opinion that the legislative
history of silent statutes is valuable in determining whether or not the
Legislature intended to implicitly include or exclude mens rea re-
quirements from the statute.1 6
This new approach to silent statute analysis is markedly different
because in the past the court has considered legislative intent only in
passing. Part I discusses how, for over a century, the court primarily
based silent statute decisions on judicial policy determinations. Absent
9. Id. at 680.
10. Id. at 681.
11. Mens rea refers to "[t]he state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a convic-
tion, must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1006 (8th ed. 2004).
12. 4 P.3d 297 (Cal. 2000).
13. 95 P.3d 906 (Cal. 2004).
14. SeeJennings, 95 P.3d at 914-17; Jorge M., 4 P.3d at 300-03.
15. SeeJennings, 95 P.3d at 915-17.
16. Id.; Jorge M., 4 P.3d at 301-02.
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from the court's recent decisions in Jorge M. and Jennings is any indica-
tion that the California Supreme Court Justices feel that the task of
weighing the wisdom of including a mens rea element belongs to
them. Indeed, the court appears to have relegated all such power to
the Legislature.
The court's search for specific legislative intent is a type of inten-
tionalism. The term intentionalism refers to a foundational frame-
work for deciding cases by uncovering the will of those who passed a
particular piece of legislation into law.' 7 "Under this view, the Court
acts as the enacting legislature's faithful servant, discovering and ap-
plying the legislature's original intent."18 In its strictest form, inten-
tionalism constitutes the process of deriving the actual intent of the
legislative body that passed a statute.' 9 Because deriving the rationale
behind the decisions of each member of the legislature, or at least
that of a majority of each house, would be impossible, intentionalism
most commonly takes a more conventional form. This includes look-
ing to floor statements by bill sponsors and committee reports.20
Competing against intentionalism are other foundational theo-
retical frameworks, such as textualism and purposivism, as well as the-
ories that less stricdy adhere to any one particular legal foundation. In
interpreting statutes, courts may choose which theory to rest their hats
on.
2 1
Part I concludes that the Jorge M.-Jennings framework reflects a
fundamental shift in California jurisprudence, completing intention-
alism's metamorphosis from reasoning thrown into cases as an after-
thought into the heart of silent statute interpretation in California.
Part II of this Comment argues that the first two tests of this
framework, Jorge M. and Jennings themselves, resulted in two uncon-
vincing decisions, each of which creates anomalous rules of law.
In Part III, this Comment further argues that the California Su-
preme Court's decisions in Jorge M. and Jennings are flawed because
the new framework that the court has created to analyze silent statutes
requires a search for a specific legislative intent that does not exist.
Part III first contends that the court's new approach to silent statutes
17. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 325 (1990).
18. Id.
19. See id. at 326.
20. See id. at 326-27.
21. Different legal theories are so numerous that an entire Comment could be de-
voted to a barebones survey of all of them. As such, a comprehensive list of alternative legal
theories is far beyond the scope of this Comment.
Summer 2005] IMAGINARY INTENT
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
is theoretically flawed because the nature of legislative bodies makes it
unlikely that any specific legislative intent as to mens rea requirements
actually exists. This section next presents several arguments that sug-
gest that in the case of California's silent statutes, circumstances exist
that make it particularly unlikely that the legislature actually possessed
any specific intent as to the proper mens rea requirement. First, the
history of the California Penal Code reveals a legislative deference to
the courts in answering mens rea questions left by ambiguous statutes.
Indeed, the California Legislature has long desired for the courts to
play a traditional common law role. In addition, the structure of the
California Penal Code also suggests that the Legislature intends for
the courts to play a common law role in interpretation of silent stat-
utes. Finally, the Legislature's established competence in expressly in-
cluding or excluding mens rea requirements provides a strong
indication that when it fails to expressly answer such questions, its in-
tent was, in fact, to defer to the wisdom of the courts. This indicates
again that the court has created an analytical framework in which it is
most likely searching for a legislative intent that does not exist.
I. Jorge M. and Jennings Establish an Intentionalist
Framework, Completing Intentionalism's Journey from
Afterthought Reasoning to the Core of the
Court's Analysis in Silent Statute Cases
This section argues that before the California Supreme Court
adopted its current doctrine regarding silent statutes, any intentional-
ist analysis was simply afterthought reasoning, usually thrown into the
end of opinions, likely as a ceremonial salute to those who wrote the
laws. Recently, however, the court has shifted its course and adopted a
framework that primarily relies on the derivation of the Legislature's
specific intent in determining the proper mens rea requirement for a
given silent statute. Indeed, beginning with Jorge M. and then solidi-
fied through Jennings, the court has made intentionalism the founda-
tion of silent statute analysis.
A. Despite Using Intentionalist Language, the Court's Decisions in
Silent Statute Cases Have Historically Rested on Other
Grounds, with Legislative Intent as an
Afterthought
The California Supreme Court has historically maintained the
freedom to decide silent statute cases through a dynamic reasoning
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process, relying more on other interpretive tools, rather than strictly
adhering to legislative intent.2 2 Nevertheless, the court has long used
intentionalist language in silent statute cases.23 Rather than honoring
an intentionalist foundation in these cases, the court has generally
made reference to legislative intent simply as a kind of ceremonial tip
of its cap to the Legislature as the drafters of the laws the court was
then interpreting.24 The rationale used to decide these cases actually
includes judicial policy determinations characteristic of a more dy-
namic approach to statutory interpretation.2 5
An important distinction exists between cases in which courts util-
ize an intentionalist framework and cases in which courts feign a dis-
covery of legislative intent while actually using other legal reasoning.26
In the former, the analysis and disposition of cases will revolve around
an inquiry designed to derive the intent of the Legislature.27 In the
latter, decisions reached through other means are attributed to the
Legislature. 28 Beginning prior to the codification of the California Pe-
nal Code and continuing until only recently, the California Supreme
Court silent statute cases that refer to legislative intent have consist-
ently fallen into this latter group. 29 Indeed, some silent statute cases
make no reference at all to legislative intent.30
22. See generally People v. Simon, 886 P.2d 1271 (Cal. 1995); People v. Vogel, 299 P.2d
850 (Cal. 1956); People v. Ahart, 159 P. 160 (Cal. 1916).
23. See Simon, 886 P.2d at 1287 ("We see no reason, in logic or public policy why the
Legislature would intend to apply a higher standard." (quoting People v. Calban, 65 Cal.
App. 3d 578, 585 (1976))); see also Vogel, 299 P.3d at 854 ("The 'correct and authoritative
exposition of Sec. 20' . . . compels the conclusion that guilty knowledge . .. was omitted
from section 281 [statute prohibiting bigamy] to reallocate the burden of proof on that
issue in a bigamy trail."); Ahart, 159 P. at 161 ("[W]hen a criminal statute is ... open to
construction .. .of two permissible constructions [the] one under which the law is valid
will be adopted as expressing the intent of the legislative body.").
24. See generally Simon, 886 P.2d 1271; Vogel, 299 P.2d 850; Ahart, 159 P. 160.
25. See generally Simon, 886 P.2d 1271; Vogel, 299 P.2d 850; Ahart, 159 P. 160.
26. See Dannye Holley, Culpability Evaluations in the State Supreme Courts from 1977 to
1999, 34 AKRON L. REv. 401, 402 n.18 (2001).
Courts are loath to admit they are, in fact, making culpability evaluations as op-
posed to the more narrow and traditional judicial function of ascertaining legisla-
tive intent with regard to the requisite culpable mental state. But since ... state
legislatures have simply not made culpability evaluations for many objective ele-
ments of new or reenacted crimes, searching for such intent is often pretense.
Id.
27. See, e.g., In reJennings, 95 P.3d 906 (Cal. 2004); In reJorge M. 4 P.3d 297 (Cal.
2000).
28. See Holley, supra note 26, at 401 n.18.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 31-54.
30. See, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964); People v. McClennegen,
234 P. 91, 101 (Cal. 1925); People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678 (1866).
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For instance, in People v. Harris,3 1 the court reversed the trial
court's decision that no mens rea was required, holding instead that
knowledge was indeed an element of the crime.32 In so holding, the
court looked, not to the intent of the Legislature, but rather to "the
universal doctrine that to constitute what the law deems a crime there
must concur both an evil act and an evil intent."33 The court found
that the prosecution must, therefore, prove knowledge of voting previ-
ously in order to secure a conviction. 34
The court went on to say that, "if it be an act in itself unlawful,
the law in the first instance presumes it to have been intended, and
proof of the justification or excuse lies on the defendant to overcome
this legal and natural presumption. '" 35 The court did not expand on
its reasoning behind this burden shifting process.36 Nevertheless, its
reference to the "natural presumption" that the doing of an act that
the law proscribes is done with the intent to do that act, suggests that
it was making a policy judgment based on all of the considerations
before it, including social mores, that this shift of the burden simply
made the most sense, and was most consistent with the principles of
criminal law and the interests of the public. Again, the court never
mentioned legislative intent.
Some years later, the court addressed another silent statute in In
re Ahart.3 7 The court examined whether an ordinance that prohibited
selling alcohol outside of designated areas included knowledge of the
character of the place where the liquor was sold as an element of the
crime. 38 The Ahart court did not make a search for the actual intent of
the Legislature the central focus of its analysis. 39 Instead, it relied on
precedent and rules of construction, both of which it felt leaned
strongly toward the inclusion of a knowledge requirement.40 In so do-
31. 29 Cal. 678 (1866).
32. Id. at 679.
33. Id. at 681 (citations omitted).
34. Id.
35. Id. (citations omitted).
36. See id.
37. 159 P. 160 (Cal. 1916).
38. See id. at 161. The number of the statute in question was not provided by the
court, however it provided that as follows:
Every person who ... transports within the city of Covina, spirituous, or vinous, or
malt, or mixed, liquors or intoxicating drinks, or vessels for containing the same,
to any place, the establishing or keeping of which is prohibited by this ordi-
nance . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
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ing, the court did use arguably intentionalist language, stating that
"when a criminal statute is ... open to construction... of two permis-
sible constructions [the] one under which the law is valid will be
adopted as expressing the intent of the legislative body."41 Because it
believed the law to be invalid without a knowledge requirement, the
court found that the statute did include such an element and that a
defendant charged under it was entitled to a reasonable mistake of
fact defense. 42 The court thus held that the statute was not invalid. 43
While the rule of construction itself was crucial to the court's decision,
its lone reference to "the intent of the legislative body" adds nothing
to its analysis, nor does it reflect any real probe into what the Legisla-
ture intended in drafting the statute.
People v. Vogel,44 an oft cited silent statute decision from decades
after Ahart, which also used somewhat intentionalist language, further
reinforced that the court, even when speaking as intentionalists, had
acted to the contrary.45 In Vogel, the court was presented with the ques-
tion of whether a charge of bigamy, which had expressly required a
knowledge element prior to codification but was codified as a silent
statute, required knowledge by the defendant that he was still legally
married. 46 The court's holding explicitly parallels Harris, stating that
the bigamy statute implicitly requires knowledge that he was married,
and that a defendant is not guilty if he has a reasonable belief that he
was no longer legally married. 47
In its decision, the court refers often to legislative intention, and
even uses legislative history.48 The court looked at the commissioners'
annotation to section 20, finding that the commissioners cited Harris
41. Id.
42. Id. at 162.
43. See id. at 161-62.
44. 299 P.2d 850 (Cal. 1956).
45. Id. The piece of Vogel that has had the greatest influence on subsequent case law
came as a footnote justifying its assertion that guilty intent can be excluded "by necessary
implication." Id. at 853. The court claimed the existence of what later became well known
as Public Welfare Offenses. "Under many statutes enacted for the protection of the public
health and safety, e.g., traffic and food and drug regulations, criminal sanctions are relied
upon even if there is no wrongful intent." Id at 853 n.2. The California Penal Code makes
no reference to such offenses, and the court cites only to several law review articles as
authority for their existence. Id. This footnote in Vogel has served to continue the silent
statute dilemma into an era that has given considerably more weight to California Penal
Code sections 20 and 26 than ever before. Indeed, this Comment would likely be superflu-
ous had the statement never been made.
46. Id. at 852-53.
47. See id. at 852.
48. See id. at 853-55.
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extensively and suggested that the case gave the proper analytical
framework for analysis of the act and intent requirement. 49 Thus, the
court derived from the legislative history the general intent behind
the enactment of a related statute, rather than the specific intent of
the Legislature in the statute before it. This led the California Su-
preme Court to reason that the omission of intent from the bigamy
statute, enacted simultaneously, did not imply the exclusion of a
knowledge element, but rather suggested a burden shift to the defen-
dant to prove that he had reasonably believed that his wife had di-
vorced him.50 Had the court ended its discussion at this point, its
decision could appropriately be deemed intentionalist and would
have been fairly unconvincing.
The court instead went on to test the inference it had made as to
legislative intent through other interpretive tools.5 1 The court ex-
amined how the statute fit within the greater legal system surrounding
it, the social policy consequences of holding people to one of the big-
amy statute's provisions without any knowledge requirement, and how
to reconcile it with precedent cases. Ultimately, the court found that
each was consistent with the court's inference that a knowledge ele-
ment should be included in the offense. 52
The court states in this discussion that these factors "make it ex-
tremely unlikely that the Legislature meant to include the morally in-
nocent to make sure the guilty did not escape. '5 3 This argument is
prefaced, however, by the statement that "[t]he foregoing construc-
tion of sections 281 and 282 [bigamy statutes] is consistent with good
sense and justice. '54 Thus, the real message the court expresses seems
to be that the Legislature did not likely intend to enact an unjust stat-
ute. Thus, the court is not declaring that it has actually found the
specific legislative intent of the statute. While framed in intentionalist
language, the Vogel court takes into account numerous factors, includ-
ing its own sense of reason and justice that would have little value to
an intentionalist court. Until as recently as the middle of the 1900s,
the only references to legislative intent were passing afterthoughts,
rather than persuasive reasoning used to decide silent statute cases.
49. See id. at 854.
50. Id. at 853-54.
51. Id. at 854-55.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 855.
54. Id.
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In People v. Simon,55 the most recent pre-Jorge M. silent statute
case, the court used its strongest intentionalist language to date and
even attempted to find the Legislature's intent through legislative his-
tory.56 Yet the court made its finaljudgment only after examining how
the statutes in question fit within the broader regulatory scheme
within which they were enacted and considering, on its own, the social
policy ramifications of the options before it.57 In Simon, a defendant
who had been convicted of selling unqualified securities and selling
securities by the use of false statements or omissions appealed his con-
viction based on the argument that knowledge of falsity or the mis-
leading nature of the statement was an element of the offense. 58 The
statute in question provided no explicit answer to this question.5 9
Simon's analysis began-for the first time in the California Su-
preme Court's history of handling silent statutes-with a search for
the Legislature's specific intent through use of legislative history.
60
Nevertheless, the court could not find any traditional form of the stat-
ute's legislative history.61 Instead, it could find only the peripheral
writings of some of the statute's drafters and the United States Su-
preme Court's analysis of the legislative history of the federal act after
which the California statute was modeled. 62 The court felt the Legisla-
ture would surely be aware of this analysis. 63 Thus, the court's attempt
to find actual intent of the Legislature through legislative history pro-
duced less than compelling results. The court admitted as much stat-
ing: "Neither the language and history of section 25540 nor reference
to the federal law after which 25401 was patterned resolves this ques-
tion .... "64
Acknowledging that the legislative history was not strong enough
evidence to decide the case, the court looked to the placement of the
statute within the broader legislative structure surrounding it, as well
55. 886 P.2d 1271 (Cal. 1995).
56. See id. at 1281-91.
57. See id. at 1287-91.
58. See id. at 1273-75.
59. See id. at 1280; see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 25540(a) (West Supp. 2005) ("Any per-
son who willfully violates any provision of this division [including section 25401], or who
willfully violates any rule or order under this division, shall upon conviction .... ") The
statute could be violated through willful conduct whether or not the perpetrator had
knowledge of the facts that made the act a crime.
60. See Simon, 886 P.2d at 1281-85.
61. See id. at 1285.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 1282.
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as at section 20.65 The court determined that this structure, coupled
with section 20, made it unlikely that legislative intent to create a strict
liability offense even existed. 66 The reason for this was that the statu-
tory scheme made the more severe of two tiers of civil penalties for the
conduct in question dependant on knowledge, and the court found it
"unreasonable . . .to conclude that when the Legislature created the
third tier of enforcement, criminal prosecution with sentence to state
prison ... it intended to dispense with any element of knowledge or
scienter while permitting a much greater sanction. 67
Despite the intentionalist language, the court actually incorpo-
rated its own social policy judgments to find the solution that it be-
lieved was most just. It appeared to the court unjust for one to be
punished criminally for conduct that would not be civilly culpable. 68
Language of a court of appeal, cited with approval in Simon, suggests
as much.69 Thus, Simon's reference here to the Legislature's intent was
merely paying homage to the statutory scheme's authors, similar to
those in Ahart and Vogel.
Thus, the court, throughout its history, has consistently rested its
opinions on non-intentionalist grounds when determining whether si-
lent statutes include a mens rea element. This statutory approach
never included any mention of the legislative history of the statute as a
means of deriving the actual legislative intent until Simon, and even
then the court found this endeavor fruitless. Any language in these
cases indicating a belief that such intent even exists is limited to an
intent presumed to be held based upon the best judgments of the
court. Intentionalism has rarely taken on a form more significant than
ceremonious language thrown into the end of a case. With the new
millennium, however, came a new theoretical framework for handling
silent statutes in California.
65. See id. at 1287-91.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 1287.
68. See id.
69. See id. "We see no reason in logic or public policy why the Legislature would in-
tend to apply a higher standard of criminal culpability-i.e., absolute liability for filing a
false affidavit regardless of knowledge of the falsity-to private persons as contrasted with
public officials and employees." (quoting People v. Calban, 65 Cal. App. 3d 578, 585
(1976)).
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B. Jorge M. and Jennings Make Intentionalism the Core of Silent
Statute Analysis by Relying on the Use of Legislative
History to Find the Legislature's Specific Intent
While the prior case law described above reveals that the Califor-
nia Supreme Court had never previously relied on deriving the Legis-
lature's specific intent to decide silent statute cases, Jorge M. and
Jennings changed the judicial landscape. These two cases took a theo-
retical framework that had been little more than lip service until Si-
mon and made it the focus of silent statute analysis.
In Jorge M., a minor had been adjudicated delinquent in juvenile
court for possession of an assault weapon in violation of California
Penal Code section 12280(b). 70 Section 12280(b) was enacted as part
of the Assault Weapon Control Act ("AWCA").71 Among the questions
before the court was whether in order to be convicted under section
12280(b), a silent statute, 72 the offender must have knowledge that he
was in possession of a weapon considered to be an assault weapon
under the AWCA. 73
The court framed its ultimate question of first impression as:
"Whether section 12280(b) can properly be categorized as a public
welfare offense, for which the Legislature intended guilt without proof of
any scienter."74 This question in itself reflects an intentionalist founda-
tion, as the court takes for granted that the Legislature indeed had an
intention and makes finding that intent the focus of its inquiry. Never-
theless, without more, the court's statement could merely be the same
sort of ceremony without substance seen in its earlier cases. The
court's reasoning in the case, however, suggests otherwise.
In attempting to find the specific legislative intent, the court
looked to a criminal law treatise by LaFave and Scott.75 The court
adopted this treatise's list of seven factors that "courts have commonly
taken into account in deciding whether a statute should be construed
as a public welfare offense," 76 as a framework for approaching the si-
70. In rejorge M., 4 P.3d 297, 299 (Cal. 2000); CAL. PENAL CODE § 12880(b) (West
1999).
71. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12275-12290 (West 2000).
72. The statute provides in relevant part that "any person who, within this state, pos-
sesses any assault weapon, except as provided in this chapter, is guilty of a public offense."
Id. § 12280(b).
73. Jorge M., 4 P.3d at 297.
74. Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
75. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw 342-44 (1986).
76. Jorge M., 4 P.3d at 301.
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lent statute in question. 77 The first factor in this framework with which
the court was to determine the Legislature's specific intent was the
statute's "legislative history and context. ' 78 Thus, the court bolstered
its intentionalist language with very real intentionalist reasoning.
The court did not delve deeply into the legislative history of sec-
tion 12280(b), however, because it found that the legislative history of
the statute provided "no specific evidence of an intent to include or
exclude any particular scienter . . . [or] any mens rea element for a
section 12280(b) violation. ' 79 The court did, however, make clear that
such evidence could be used to infer an actual specific legislative in-
tent. Indeed, the court expressly made a declaration that using legisla-
tive history to assist in finding this intent is appropriate.80 The court
also framed its entire analysis of the case in terms of the Legislature's
actual intention as to mens rea requirements in enacting the statute.81
In Jennings, the California Supreme Court built upon its decision
inJorge M. that it could look at legislative history to determine whether
the specific intention of the Legislature was to create a public welfare
offense or one requiring a union of act and intent by making this
query the centerpiece of its framework.8 2 Jennings relied on legislative
history in a way that no silent statute case in California history had
previously done.8 3 The case confronted the court with a man con-
victed, under section 25658(c) of the California Business and Profes-
sional Code, 4 of purchasing alcohol for a person under twenty-one
who then drove and caused serious injury or death to himself or
others.85 The question in the case was whether the statute required
knowledge that the person for whom the man had bought alcohol was
77. Id. Paraphrasing LaFave & Scott, the court listed the seven factors as:
(1) the legislative history and context; (2) any general provision on mens rea or
strict liability crimes; (3) the severity of the punishment provided for the crime;
(4) the seriousness of the harm to the public that may be expected to follow from
the forbidden conduct; (5) the defendant's opportunity to ascertain the true
facts; (6) the difficulty prosecutors would have in proving a mental state for the
crime; (7) the number of prosecutions to be expected under the statute.
Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 302-03.
80. Id. at 301.
81. Id. at 302.
82. In reJennings, 95 P.3d 906, 915-17 (Cal. 2004).
83. See id. at 919 (stating that legislative history provided the strongestjustification for
the court's holding).
84. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25658(c) (West Supp. 2005).
85. See id. 908-09.
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under twenty-one. 8 6 The court agreed with lower courts that knowl-
edge of age was not an element of a section 25658(c) violation but
also held that mistake of fact was in fact an affirmative defense to the
crime. 87
The court's analysis focused heavily on legislative history.
88
Rather than go through each of the seven Jorge M. factors, the Jennings
court disposed of four of the seven, believing that only "three fac-
tors... the legislative history and context of the statute, the severity of
the punishment, and the seriousness of the harm to the public," were
relevant.89 Thus, the court instantly made legislative history one of
three, rather than one of seven, categories with which courts should
derive legislative intent. In applying these factors, the court began by
stating, "First and foremost, the legislative history of section 25658(c)
strongly suggests the Legislature intended to impose guilt without a
showing the offender knew the age of the person for whom alcohol
was purchased."90 The court examined in depth the legislative history
of section 25658(c) and suggested that the history provided a heavy
implication that the Legislature intended not to include any mens
rea.
9 1
These two cases clearly reveal that the court has adopted an in-
tentionalist approach to silent statutes. Jorge M. makes the principle
focus of inquiry in silent statute cases whether the Legislature in-
86. Id. at 910-11. Section 25658(c) of the California Business and Professional Code
provides:
Any person who violates subdivision (a) by purchasing any alcoholic beverage
for . . . a person under the age of 21 years and the person under the age of 21
years thereafter consumes the alcohol and thereby proximately causes great bod-
ily injury or death to himself, herself, or any other person, is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
Id. § 25658(c). Subdivision (a) provides: "Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (c),
every person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away, any
alcoholic beverage to any person under the age of 21 years is guilty of a misdemeanor." Id.
§ 25658(c).
87. Jennings, 95 P.3d at 919, 922. While the court addressed both the act requirements
of section 25658 (c) and the parallel issue of the knowledge required to prove a violation of
section 25658(a), a lesser included offense, discussion of these elements has been omitted
for brevity. It is worth noting, however, that the court refers to the legislative history of
section 25658(c) to show that its focus was on more than just "'shoulder tapping,' or ask-
ing an adult, often in front of a liquor store, to purchase alcohol for a minor." Id. at 912.
Also, the court's conclusion that all evidence before it "suggest[s] the Legislature has dis-
pensed with any requirement of knowledge or some criminal intent" for section 25658(a)
is phrased in strongly intentionalist language. Id. at 915.
88. See id. at 915-17.
89. Id. at 915.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 915-17.
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tended to make an offense a public welfare offense or one including
at least some criminal intent.92 It also opened the door for the use of
legislative history to derive the Legislature's precise intent.
Jennings burst this door wide open by continuing on an intention-
alist path and relying primarily on legislative history to reach its con-
clusion as to what the Legislature's intentions were. 93 The gravity of
this decision should not be underestimated. The court used the availa-
ble legislative history behind section 25658(c) to infer the Legisla-
ture's intent and answer a question that the court acknowledged the
statute itself did not answer. Further, Jennings solidifies intentionalism
as the court's preferred approach to silent statutes. Thus, if the use of
legislative history to derive the actual intent of the Legislature and
intentionalism itself do not rest on solid footing, then both the court's
decision in this case and the state of silent statutes in California's sub-
stantive criminal law exist in great peril. As the remainder of this Com-
ment shows, this is precisely the case.
Prior to these cases, the California Supreme Court often used in-
tentionalist language, but just as often did not. Of its recorded cases
interpreting silent statutes, the court has used intentionalist language
in three of them94 and omitted any reference to a search for legislative
intent in three cases.95 What makes these cases different is that to-
gether they establish intentionalism not simply as an approach that
the court can shift in and out of at the whim of the justice chosen to
write the decision-as seems to have historically been the case 96-but
rather a framework for approaching silent statutes centered around
92. See In reJorge M., 4 P.3d 297, 301 (Cal. 2000).
93. SeeJennings, 95 P.3d at 915-17.
94. See People v. Simon, 886 P.2d 1271, 1287 (Cal. 1995) ("We see no reason in logic
or public policy why the Legislature would intend to apply a higher standard." (quoting
People v. Calban, 65 Cal. App. 3d 578, 585 (1976))); see also People v. Vogel, 299 P.3d 850,
854 (Cal. 1956) ("The 'correct and authoritative exposition of Sec. 20' . . . compels the
conclusion that guilty knowledge . . .was omitted from section 281 [statute prohibiting
bigamy] to reallocate the burden of proof on that issue in a bigamy trial."); People v.
Ahart, 159 P. 160, 161 (Cal. 1916) ("[Wjhen a criminal statute is ... open to construc-
tion ... of two permissible constructions that [the] one under which the law is valid will be
adopted as expressing the intent of the legislative body.").
95. See People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678 (1866); see also People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673
(Cal. 1964); People v. McClennegen, 234 P. 91, 101 (Cal. 1925) ("Whether a criminal
intent or guilty knowledge is a necessary element of a statutory offense is a matter of con-
struction to be determined from the language of the statute, in view of its manifest purpose
and design.").
96. See discussion infra Part III for the premise that intentionalism had not previously
been the backbone of silent statute cases.
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deriving legislative intent. Thus, courts following these decisions in
the future as precedent will be forced into an intentionalist box.
II. The Intentionalist Framework Used in Jorge M. and
Jennings Resulted in Unconvincing Decisions That
Created Anomalous Law
The initial test of the intentionalist foundation that the California
Supreme Court has established through Jorge M. and Jennings is the
two cases themselves. As such, these decisions fail to produce convinc-
ing results and bring about legal rules that are anomalous and incon-
sistent with California substantive criminal law.
The Jorge M. court found that there was no compelling evidence
in the statute's text or its history to tip the scales in favor or against the
implicit inclusion of a mens rea requirement. The court believed that
the presumption created by section 20, the difficulty in determining
whether a particular weapon falls under the statute's proscriptions,
and the severity of punishment for the crime all leaned toward the
inclusion of some mens rea requirement. The court reasoned, how-
ever, that the grave public concerns at stake, the numerous prosecu-
tions expected, and the difficulty that requiring actual knowledge on
the part of defendants would present to prosecutors suggested that
"section 12280(b) was not intended to contain such an actual knowl-
edge element. ' 97 With all the factors being equally balanced, the court
held that the prosecution must prove that defendants charged with
violations of the statute either knew or negligently failed to know that
the weapon had characteristics that subjected it to the regulation by
the AWCA. 98
The decision appears to essentially boil down to the court's find-
ing that, since it could glean nothing from the legislative history of the
statute, and since three of the other six factors favoring inclusion of a
knowledge requirement and three favored exclusion, the court split
the difference and decided that the Legislature must have intended
something in between. The court essentially admits as much, stating
that "the AWCA has some key characteristics of a public welfare of-
fense,justifying the inference that the Legislature intended guilt to be
established by proof of a mental state slightly lower than ordinarily
required for criminal liability."99 In effect, the court concluded that
97. In reJorge M., 4 P.3d 297, 311 (Cal. 2000).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 311 n.11.
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the Legislature intended for the courts to apply a simple negligence
standard.
Strikingly, a simple negligence standard had never before been
seen in California criminal law.100 Section 20 has required that crimes
are punishable only on the finding of criminal intent or criminal neg-
ligence since the codification of the Penal Code in 1872.101 Public
welfare offenses have never required any mens rea. 10 2 Prior to Jorge
M., no middle ground existed. The court held that the Legislature, in
its wisdom, saw fit to establish an entirely new standard of criminal
liability, out of step with centuries of statutory and jurisprudential pre-
cedent, without telling anyone what it was doing. Logically, however,
this seems quite unlikely.
The Jennings court appeared to appreciate the thin ice upon
which Jorge M. rested such a monumental holding. By eliminating four
of the seven Jorge M. factors, the court greatly reduced the likelihood
of needing another tie-breaking compromise. 10 3 This put more pres-
sure on the court, however, to come to a conclusion as to whether the
legislative intent favored the inclusion or exclusion of a mens rea re-
quirement. The court's reasoning crumbled under this pressure.
In examining the legislative history, the court noted that Assem-
bly Bill No. 1204,104 which became section 25658(c), had been
amended before the full Assembly to expressly include as a requisite
element for imprisonment in state prison under subsection (c) that
the offender knew or should reasonably have known that the person
the alcohol was purchased for was under twenty-one.10 5 The court also
noted that, on leaving the Assembly, the bill's Legislative Counsel's
Digest stated that such mens rea was required for felony convictions
under the statute.'0 6 Thus, the California Assembly was certainly con-
100. Ronald L. Moore, The California Supreme Court Adopts a New Test and a Civil Negli-
gence Standard Where a Criminal Statute Lacks an Express Mental Element: The In re Jorge M.
Case, 28 W. ST. U. L. REv. 207, 207-08 (2001).
101. CAL. PENAL. CODE § 20 (West 1999).
102. See In rejorge M., 4 P.3d 297, 301 (Cal. 2000); see also People v. Vogel, 299 P.2d
850, 853 (Cal. 1956).
103. While the court stated that only the three factors that it discussed had "substantial
application," it seems more likely that these were the only factors the court wanted to
include in its discussion. See In reJennings, 95 P.3d 906, 915 (Cal. 2004). Section 20's
general provisions seem no less relevant to section 25658(c) than to section 12280(b). Nor
do the defendant's ability to uncover the key facts, the prosecutor's challenge in proving
that the defendant knew these facts, nor the number of prosecutions expected appear to
be any less applicable.
104. S. Amend. to Assem. B. No. 1204, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998).
105. Jennings, 95 P.3d at 916.
106. Id.
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cerned that the statute may be overly harsh if applied in certain ways
to those without mens rea.
The court then traced the bill as it entered the Senate and
pointed out that "Assembly Bill No. 1204 was thereafter amended to
delete the felony option together with its intent requirement, leaving
section 25658(c) as a misdemeanor provision only, with no explicit
intent requirement." 0 7 It was this version that passed through the
Senate and into law after the governor signed it. The Jennings court
stated that "the obvious inference [was] that in deleting the felony
option, with its attached intent requirement, the Legislature intended
to leave the new crime a misdemeanor only, with no intent
requirement."10 8
The court's reasoning, however, contains a false positive. Simply
because the Legislature opted against expressly including a mental
state element does not mean that it intended to exclude one. Rather,
as is discussed in greater detail in Part III, it is just as likely, if not more
likely, to be indicative of legislative deference to the wisdom of the
courts in handling questions of appropriate mens rea requirements.
The court compounded its faulty reasoning in attempting to bol-
ster its shaky conclusion through discussion of the context in which
the legislation was enacted. The court cited to examples in related
statutes that expressly included the requirement that a defendant
must "knowingly" do certain acts in order to be convicted and asserts
that the Legislature would have done the same with 25658(c) had it
intended to include knowledge of age as a requirement. 109 None of
these examples the court offered, however, pertained to knowledge of
another person's age. 110 In addition, the court failed to examine sec-
tion 25658(d), part of the very same statute as 25658(c), which contains
language making it punishable to "knowingly" allow those under
twenty-one to drink on the premises whether or not the defendant
knew how old they were." 1 This strongly undermines the conclusion
reached in Jennings and suggests that the Legislature can include
mens rea provisions when it wants to. This point too is discussed in
Part III.
107. Id. (citing S. Amend. to Assem. B. No. 1204, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998)).
108. Id. at 917.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. CAL. PENAL CODE § 25658(c) (West Supp. 2005) ("Any on-sale licensee who know-
ingly permits a person under the age of 21 years to consume any alcoholic beverage in the
on sale premises, whether or not the licensee has knowledge that the person is under the
age of 21 years, is guilty of a misdemeanor.").
Summer 2005] IMAGINARY INTENT
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
While Jennings's reasoning in determining whether or not to in-
clude a mens rea element in 25658(c) leaves much to be desired, the
court did return to an "either or" standard, approaching 25658(c) as
if it either had a mens rea element, or it did not. This at least made
the Jennings's conclusion plausible, and had the court stopped there,
the decision would not have greatly offended any well-established
principles of California criiinal law. Nevertheless, it did not.
The court went on to discuss the availability of a mistake of fact
defense. 112 It acknowledged that, according to statutory law, and " [a] s
a general matter,... a mistake of fact defense is not available unless
the mistake disproves an element of the offense." 113 Nonetheless, de-
spite the fact that it had just held section 25658(c) to be a public wel-
fare offense that included no mental state element, it held that
violators of section 25658(c) must be allowed to raise the mistake of
fact as a defense.1 14 Again, the court created a rule of law completely
anomalous to preexisting California law. The court essentially en-
dorsed a nonsensical scenario in which a defendant may escape crimi-
nal punishment by raising an affirmative defense of mistake of fact in
order to disprove a mental state element that does not exist.
In each of the first two cases applying a strict intentionalist frame-
work, the court has failed to reach convincing decisions and has torn
at the existing fabric of California criminal law with unprecedented
substantive holdings.
III. The Use of an Intentionalist Framework in Silent Statute
Interpretation Leads the Court in a Search for a
Specific Legislative Intent that Does Not Exist
The California Supreme Court's failure to reach compelling deci-
sions in Jorge M. and Jennings results not from happenstance, but
rather from its use of strict intentionalist framework. Indeed, the fail-
ures ofJorge M. and Jennings stem from inherent flaws in applying such
a framework to silent statutes, especially in California. This is because
the Jorge M.-Jennings framework searches for a specific legislative intent
that does not exist in silent statutes.
112. In re Jennings, 95 P.3d 906, 919-23 (Cal. 2004).
113. Id. at 920; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (West 1999) (excusing from criminal culpabil-
ity "[p]ersons who committed the act or made the omission charged under an ignorance
or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent").
114. Jennings, 95 P.3d at 919-23.
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A. The Nature of the Legislative Process Makes It Unlikely That
the Legislature Has Any Specific Intent as to Mens Rea
When It Drafts a Silent Statute
The legislative process is long and complicated. In California, a
bill must leap numerous hurdles before it is eventually enacted as a
law. 115 California has a bicameral Legislature with an Assembly and a
Senate.'1 6 After it is drafted, a new bill must pass through the Assem-
bly or Senate Rules Committee where it is passed on to one of many
policy committees in its house of origin.' 17 Once the bill has passed
through committee, it is put to the full house for a vote. 118 Both in the
policy committee and before the entire house, the bill is subject to
amendments brought by various legislators.1 1 9 Once the bill passes
through its house of origin, it must go through the identical process
in the other house. 120 After the second house has passed the bill, the
house of origin must concur on any changes made to it before it is
passed into law. 121
This intricate legislative process makes ascertaining a legitimate,
trustworthy intention of the Legislature difficult, if not, impossible. As
such, the Jorge M.-Jennings framework is vulnerable to attack.
Moreover, the nature of the political process makes it highly un-
likely that much of the legislative history available to the court reflects
the will of a majority of both houses of the Legislature. 122 Jennings,
115. See generally SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN GOV'T, THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: A CITIZEN's GUIDE TO PARTICIPATION 11 (1996).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. If the house of origin does not concur with the changes made by the second
house, the bill is sent to a bicameral, six-person committee to reach a compromise. Id. The
bill then goes back to each house for passage. Id.
122. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("An enactment by implication cannot realistically be regarded as the product of the diffi-
cult lawmaking process our Constitution has prescribed. Committee reports, floor
speeches, and even colloquies between Congressmen... are frail substitutes for bicameral
vote upon the text of a law and its presentment to the President."); RICHARD F. FENNO, JR.,
CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES 1-21, 43-45, 69 (1973) (noting that different ambitions and
interests direct legislators toward different committees); JOHN D. LEES, THE COMMITTEE
SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 98-99 (1967) (describing the fact that congres-
sional committees often do not represent the larger legislative body in either composition
or decisions as among the defects of the committee system); Eskridge & Fickey, supra note
17, at 327 ("Committee members and bill sponsors are not necessarily representative of the
entire Congress, and so it is not necessarily accurate to attribute their statements to the
whole body.").
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however, makes the use of legislative history paramount in silent stat-
ute interpretation. The court's preoccupation with legislative history
in attempting to get a definite answer to a highly specific question
about a statute is ill-advised. Indeed, Justice Antonin Scalia has ex-
pressed this concern, stating that "[i] t is at best dangerous to assume
that all the necessary participants in the law-enactment process are
acting upon the same unexpressed assumptions."' 123
The court has a highly limited amount of information detailing a
statute's legislative history at its disposal. 124 This dearth of material to
work from makes it impossible to uncover the intentions of each indi-
vidual member of the Legislature in voting for or against a bill. 125 At
best, the court can simply infer that a majority of the Legislature has
the intent that the court derives from the comments of sponsors, com-
mittee reports, transcriptions of any hearings held on the matter, and
votes on various versions of proposed legislation. 126
Because of the intricate list of legislative subgroups, it is highly
unlikely that there exists any actual specific intention of a majority of
both houses of the California Legislature as to any matter that the
Legislature has not spoken on expressly. 127 The argument at hand,
however, does not depend on this concept. Rather, the argument
here stands for the broader premise that intentionalism, as the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has applied it, is always a theoretically flawed
foundation.
Reports and comments by legislative committees are some of the
most prominent forms of legislative history.' 28 Legislators are not as-
signed to committees in random fashion; they seek out the commit-
123. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 192 (Scalia, J., concurring).
124. See Eskridge & Fickey, supra note 17, at 326-27.
125. See id.
126. See id. Jorge M. and Jennings are indicative of this dependence on secondary materi-
als to derive an inferred intent of the Legislature. In Jennings, the court looked only to the
section 25658(c) as it was originally proposed, comments to the bill that accompanied it
into an Assembly committee, and several different successful votes to amend the bill. In re
Jennings, 95 P.3d 906, 913 (Cal. 2004). In Jorge M., the court examined statements by wit-
nesses called before the Assembly in preparation for the passage of section 12280(b) and
changes to the law that came about after them, as well as the legislative statement of pur-
pose to the overarching legislation of which the section was a part. In rejorge M., 98 P.3d
297, 301-02 (Cal. 2000).
127. See infra Part III.B addressing several factors making it unlikely that the California
Legislature would ever intend to silently include or exclude a mens rea requirement. This
particular section of the Comment, however, does not depend on this argument, but
rather accepts arguendo that California legislators may at times have this intention.
128. See Eskridge & Fickey, supra note 17, at 326-27.
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tees that will best serve their political interests.' 29 Therefore,
committees such as the Assembly and Senate Committees on Public
Safety are likely to be stacked with members of the Legislature whose
legislative districts are concerned heavily with crime. 30 This will likely
have an effect on the general disposition of these committees-one
that will make the committees' leanings on crime-prevention legisla-
tion different from the larger houses of the Legislature. 13' Therefore,
any legislative history that comes out of these committees is suspect if
being used to infer the actual intent of the Legislature.
In addition, the need for a bill to pass through both houses
makes it dangerous to assume the existence of a specific intent held by
the whole Legislature based upon the words or actions of members of
one house. At best, this information can arguably provide an answer
as to what that house intended.
The same problems present themselves in the use of comments
drafted by the sponsor of a particular bill. Considering all of the shuf-
fling that takes place after a bill's introduction, with multiple commit-
tees and multiple houses of the Legislature having worked with it, it
defies all reason and logic to suggest that the sponsor's words could
be of any value in answering the question of whether the final statute
included a knowledge requirement. There is no reason that the as-
sumptions of one member at a bill's inception, no matter how con-
nected to it she may be, should be attributed to the majority of both
houses of the Legislature.
A hypothetical example may prove useful in putting these ideas
together. Suppose that the California Supreme Court was presented
with another silent statute case. Legislative materials gathered by the
court revealed the following history:
The sponsor's comments indicate strongly that while she knew
clearly what act she wanted to prohibit, she had not envisioned the
situation with which the court was presented and had not considered
mens rea issues at all, as criminal intent would normally be clear. The
bill then goes to the Senate Committee on Public Safety, which, as
noted in transcripts of their proceedings, does consider the issue. The
Committee members believe that an intent requirement should be re-
quired; yet they could not politically afford to do so expressly and sub-
129. See FENNO, supra note 122, at 1-21, 43-45, 69; LEES, supra note 122, at 98-99;
Eskridge & Fickey, supra note 17, at 326-27.
130. See MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1336
(1988).
131. See FENNO, supra note 122, at 43-45; LEES, supra note 122, at 98-99.
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ject themselves to being portrayed as soft on crime. Nonetheless, the
Committee believed that the California Supreme Court will construe
the statute as requiring mens rea, and it passed the bill to the full
Senate completely in tact. The Senate discussed the mens rea issue at
length, and a floor vote indicates that there was not sufficient support
for an amendment expressly including a knowledge requirement. The
bill passes the full Senate as written.
In the Assembly Committee on Public Safety, whose members are
all from fairly conservative, "hard on crime" districts, the bill was
amended to include a phrase that a defendant could be punished
"whether or not he or she had knowledge of facts making the act crim-
inal." The majority of the full Assembly, however, believe that such
knowledge is required and vote to amend the statute to omit this
phrase and passes the bill as originally offered by the sponsor.
In this example, the sum of the individual actions by the Legisla-
ture's subgroups could not reasonably be said to imply any unified
specific intent as to whether a mens rea element should be required.
The bill's sponsor, the two committees that handled the bill, and the
two full houses each had different intentions in acting as they did.
The history indicates, for example, that the two full houses had dia-
metrically opposed views. Any court that finds a specific legislative in-
tent to exist in such a situation is clearly engaging in wishful thinking.
Concerns about imperfect and incomplete information, as well as
veiled conflicts of particular legislators, lead to the conclusion that
legislative power is far too divested to reasonably believe that a single
specific legislative intent would ever exist as to an issue not expressly
passed upon by the Legislature. The implausibility of such an intent
makes intentionalism particularly inappropriate for application in si-
lent statute analysis.
B. The Legislature Intends to Defer to the Courts When It Fails to
Include or Exclude Any Mens Rea Requirement
In addition to the general theoretical flaws in the California Su-
preme Court's intentionalism and use of legislative history to derive
the actual intent of the Legislature, there are a number of reasons
that the approach is especially inappropriate for use in California. As
the history and structure of the California Penal Code reveal, the Cali-
fornia Legislature is particularly unlikely to have any genuine specific
intent in regards to mens rea when it drafts a silent statute.
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1. The History of the California Penal Code Suggests That the
California Legislature Did Not Intend to Wrest the
Power to Make Mens Rea Determinations from
the Courts Through Codification
A probe of the history of the California Penal Code also provides
some indication as to why the court has failed to convincingly apply an
intentionalist foundation in its handling of silent statutes. Such a
query reveals that an intentionalist approach is fundamentally at odds
with the nature of the relationship between the Legislature and the
courts, a relationship that makes the existence of any specific legisla-
tive intent improbable.
At common law, courts commonly acted to fill in gaps in statutes
without ever looking to find the Legislature's specific intent as to the
gaps.132 Harris presents one such example. 133 If the Legislature
drafted a silent statute at common law, it should reasonably have ex-
pected that the courts would independently trudge through the legal
penumbras. The Legislature's available remedy was to statutorily over-
rule court decisions with which it disagreed.134 In such a legislative-
judicial relationship, the existence of a specific legislative intent in an
area in which a statute is silent is unlikely.
The California Penal Code was first enacted in 1872. It was the
result of an effort to codify the existing criminal common law into a
single body of law. 135 The codification of the common law was a prom-
inent idea at the close of the 19th century, popularized byJeremy Ben-
tham.136 Further, according to one scholar:
The movement away from the common law and toward a codified
system of law was generally motivated by a desire to limit power ofjudges; California's code was motivated by a more modest goal-it
set out simply to organize and memorialize existing common law.
Given the code's limited goal, it did little to alter the relationship
between the Legislature and the court. 137
132. Suzanne Mounts, Malice Aforethought in California: A History of Legislative Abdication
and Judicial Vacillation, 33 U.S.F. L. REv. 313, 359 (1999) ("In a common law context, in the
face of legislative inaction, the court might act to resolve a particular legal issue.").
133. See generally People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678 (1866).
134. See Mounts, supra note 132, at 359.
135. See id. at 317.
136. See id. at 320.
137. Id. at 317; see also Ralph N. Kleps, The Revision and Codification of California Statutes
1849-1953, 42 CAL. L. REv. 766, 772-73 (1954) (citing statutes empowering the committee
that drafted what became the California Code to do so under the premise that the effort
was one of compilation, not of codification as it was thought of at the time).
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Indeed, just more than a decade after the codification, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court itself acknowledged ambiguity in the newly
codified Penal Code and began to interpret it as incomplete without
reference to the common law.138 While origins of the codification
movement were more ambitious, New York's Field Penal Code, upon
which the California Penal Code was based, "aimed only at producing
a comprehensive compilation of existing criminal law, with no at-
tempt to reform or even to simplify the existing law." 13 9 In other
words, the codification itself did not change the role of the court or its
relationship with the Legislature. 140 "The Code was not seen as a
means of curtailing judicial activity or of radically shifting power to
the legislature. '"1 41 Thus, if no subsequent events shifted the roles that
the legislature and the courts in relation to one another, the court's
role in state government remains the same as it did in 1866 when
Harris was decided, a role that includes judicial gap-filling of mens rea
questions.
History suggests that no such alteration of the legislative-judicial
relationship ever occurred. In the 1980s, the Legislature confronted
several California Supreme Court decisions that concerned the de-
fenses available to criminal defendants to disprove certain specific
mental states of voluntary intoxication.1 42 It did so simply by legisla-
tively reversing the Supreme Court's decisions. 143 It answered no
larger questions that could have closed gaps in the existing law. Nor
did it define terms whose ambiguity left much room for judicial inter-
pretation. 144 Instead, the Legislature again left the courts to toil with
these issues. Thus, the relationship between the Legislature and the
courts in the handling of mens rea questions remains one of a com-
mon law nature to the present day. This nature includes legislative
deference to the courts in mens rea questions, not unexpressed legis-
lative intent.
138. Sharon v. Sharon, 16 P. 345, 350-58 (Cal. 1888).
139. Mounts, supra note 132, at 321; see also Kleps, supra note 137, at 772-73.
140. While such a limited purpose may seem suspect given the great amount of work
involved in the codification effort, the effort may well have been part of a larger effort by
California to shed its image as an unsophisticated, unorderly, unintellectual state. Califor-
nia was among the first states to codify its code, a move that many felt displayed the capac-
ity for order and intellect lacking in the state's image after the Gold Rush. See Lewis
Grossman, Codification and the California Mentality, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 617, 621-25 (1994).
141. Mounts, supra note 132, at 322.
142. See id. at 353-59.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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2. The California Legislature's Displayed Ability to Include or
Exclude Mens Rea Elements Indicates Deference to the
Judiciary in Mens Rea Issues
The structure of the California Penal Code confirms an intention
for courts to play a role reminiscent of common law times in mens rea
decisions. Discussion of mens rea is not absent from the code, and
never has been. What is included, however, is incredibly sparse.
In describing the way that courts under the new statutory regime
should approach mens rea questions, the Penal Code provides only a
general requirement of a 'joint operation of act and intent" in section
20145 and a list of situations under which an act may not be considered
criminal in section 26,146 in part a codification of the Harris burden
shifting analysis.' 47 While section 20 offers strong language requiring
criminal intent or criminal negligence for every crime or public of-
fense, the remainder of the Penal Code does not define what either
form of mens rea looks like in practice. Neither does the Code define
crimes or public offenses. As a purely practical matter, in the absence
of any further guidance from the Legislature, the courts are the only
branch of government that can resolve these issues in order to decide
cases presented to them.
Likewise, while section 26 provides certain situations under which
a person cannot be capable of committing a crime, it again provides
145. CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1999). ("TO CONSTITUTE CRIME THERE MUST
BE UNITY OF ACT AND INTENT. In every crime or public offense there must exist a
union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence.").
146. Id. § 26 (West 1999):
All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the fol-
lowing classes:
One-Children under the age of 14, in the absence of clear proof that at the
time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness.
Two-Idiots.
Three-Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged under
an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent.
Four-Persons who committed the act charged without being conscious
thereof.
Five-Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged through
misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was no evil design, inten-
tion, or culpable negligence.
Six-Persons (unless the crime be punishable with death) who committed the
act or made the omission charged under threats or menaces sufficient to show
that they had reasonable cause to and did believe their lives would be endangered
if they refused.
Id.
147. See People v. Vogel, 229 P.2d 850, 853-54 (Cal. 1956).
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no indication as to what constitutes a crime.1 48 Moreover, section 26
includes no answers to the question of how the burden of proof
should be allocated when such defenses are at issue. 149 Again, the
courts logically will have to resolve these penumbra issues.
Certainly, the Legislature is not ignorant of the fact that courts
will be asked to apply these vague statutory laws regarding mens rea. It
follows that the Legislature would not leave to the courts questions
that it had an affirmative answer to. The same conclusion is warranted
when considering the legislative drafting of silent statutes. One thing
that the legislative history detailed in Jennings does reveal is that the
Legislature is acutely aware of the questions that arise from a decision
not to expressly include a mental state provision. 150 When such ques-
tions are left unanswered it suggests that the Legislature has made a
conscious decision to leave them that way. Therefore, it is counterin-
tuitive to ask whether the Legislature intended to include or exclude a
mental state element.
In addition, the Legislature, when it is so inclined, has displayed
great proficiency in the art of both including and excluding such ele-
ments. The Legislature has exhibited the ability to expressly include
mens rea elements in requiring that criminals have knowledge of the
criminal nature of gangs they join in order to be punished for gang
membership, 15 1 knowledge that a document is about to be used as
evidence to be convicted of destroying evidence, 152 and knowledge
that their victim is an elder in order to be found guilty of battery
against an elder,153 among many others. As discussed in Part II, the
148. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (West 1999).
149. See id.
150. See In reJennings, 95 P.3d 906, 915-17 (Cal. 2004).
151. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (West 1999):
Any person who actively participates in any criminal street gang with knowledge
that its members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity,
and who willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct
by members of that gang, shall be punished by imprisonment in a countyjail for a
period not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison for 16
months, or two or three years.
Id.
152. CAL. PENAL CODE § 135 (West 1999):
Every person who, knowing that any book, paper, record, instrument in writing,
or other matter or thing, is about to be produced in evidence upon any trial,
inquiry, or investigation whatever, authorized by law, willfully destroys or conceals
the same, with intent thereby to prevent it from being produced, is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
Id.
153. CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.25 (West Supp. 2005):
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very statutory scheme in question in Jennings provides not only an-
other example of the Legislature's ability to expressly include mens
rea elements, but also a clear example of its aptitude at expressly ex-
cluding such provisions. 1
54
This again indicates that there is no specific legislative intent in
this area. Far more rational is the belief that the legislative intent in
silent statutes is not to include or to exclude mens rea, but simply to
throw its hands into the air and ask for the court's assistance. It is thus
imprudent to suggest that the failure to expressly include as an ele-
ment a provision that the defendant knowingly committed an act re-
flects any intention to exclude such an element. Rather, the fact that
the Legislature has displayed in the very same statutory scheme the
ability to include or exclude mens rea requirements strongly suggests
that while it knew the conduct that it desired to punish, the Legisla-
ture could not make a determination as to what the appropriate
mental state should be.155 Instead, it left this decision to be resolved
by the courts in their role as gap fillers.
Given this situation, it appears nonsensical to use an approach to
statutory interpretation that depends upon the presumption of an af-
firmative legislative intent. Thus, under yet another litmus test, inten-
tionalism fails to pass muster.
Conclusion
The California Supreme Court's intentionalist approach to silent
statute cases is a break from centuries of precedent. It also establishes
a foundation that requires California's courts to look for a legislative
intent that does not exist, as evidenced by sound legal theory, the
court's traditional role, and the displayed capability of the Legislature
to express what it means. Continued use of this approach will be dev-
astating for California criminal law.
The court must approach mens rea issues left unanswered by the
Legislature with an understanding that they are most likely the first
When a battery is committed against the person of an elder or a dependent adult
as defined in Section 368, with knowledge that he or she is an elder or a depen-
dent adult, the offense shall be punishable by a fine not to exceed two thousand
dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in a countyjail not to exceed one year, or by
both that fine and imprisonment.
Id.
154. See supra Part II.
155. Again, it bears repeating here that the exclusion of such an element could also
indicate that the Legislature relied on section 20's requirement of a union of act and
intent.
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branch of government to do so. Given the fact of legislative deference,
social policy concerns regarding the wisdom of including or excluding
mens rea from a silent statute will never be fully considered by any
branch of government should the courts pass on the opportunity to
interpret outside the context of a search for legislative intent. Yet this
is precisely what the intentionalist framework established by Jorge M.
and Jennings forces California courts to do. The California Supreme
Court must reverse course and release itself, as well as these lower
courts, from the hopeless quest for legislative guidance in an area
where none has been provided.
When thus unshackled, the court can develop a framework that
draws on its own wisdom in order to tackle silent statute issues. In-
deed, many of the factors the court considers may well be those used
in Jorge M. Under its new framework, however, the court would con-
sider these factors in light of what it determines is the wisest conclu-
sion, as opposed to using them in attempt to figure out what the
Legislature was actually thinking.
While this may indeed reek of judicial usurpation of the law-mak-
ing process, the alternative now utilized by the court is to imagine that
intent actually exists and purport to find it. Certainly it is far more
productive to acknowledge times in which the Legislature has failed to
resolve an issue and charge our brightest jurists with the responsibility
to do so to the best of their abilities. Doing so will allow for the court
to reach far more convincing and consistent decisions. Further, it will
honor society's interest in a criminal system that makes policy deci-
sions only after fully considering the way those decisions affect both
public safety and the level of culpability required to punish its citizens.
When the court deliberates fully on mens rea issues as they arise, as it
has done in the past, the social policy interests in punishment propor-
tional to culpability and a safe community will be in good hands.
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